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Florida's Continuing Experiment with the Central Panel Process: The
Division of Administrative Hearings
by William R. Dorsey
I.

FLORIDA'S ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

Political culture is expressed in the structures of government.
Nebraska has its unicameral legislature, no doubt for interesting
Florida's political culture has
historical reasons unique to itself.
affected the structure and functions of its central panel of
administrative law judges (whom Florida still calls hearing officers).
Floridians have a deep distrust of executive power, which they control
by fragmenting it. The unusually broad authority assigned to the
Division of.Administrative Hearings by the Florida Legislature is but
another reflection of this culture of distrust of executive authority, and
the desire to rein it in. To understand why Florida does things as it
does, it is necessary to understand a few things about Florida's political
history.
a.
Essential Background - Florida's Historical Political
Environment: Every Man for Himself.
The chapter on Florida in the classic study of southern politics
done by Professor V. 0. Key of Harvard University published shortly
after World War II, Southern Pofitics in State and Nation, is entitled
"Every Man for Himself." Written when Florida was beginning its
tremendous change from backwater to one of the nation's largest
states, Key's analysis picked up on several salient points. Long one
party rule by the Democrats led to means of competition for power
other than through general elections, where Republican candidates
were often not to be found, and in any case un-electable. The state
was large, and geographic population centers were isolated from each
other. There were no "courthouse gangs" in major population centers
controlling the local political offices; the incumbents each put together
their own organizations ad hoc. Florida lacked a cohesive statewide
party structure. Competition and regional jealousies led to constant
political realignments.'

U. S. Administrative Law Judge, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social
Security Administration; formerly a Hearing Officer, Florida Division of
Administrative Hearings. The opinions expressed are the author's, and do not
represent those of any state or federal government agency.
1 Key, Jr., V. 0. Southern Politics in State and Nation, Random House, 1949.
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Distrust of Executive Power Embodied in the Unique
Collegial Executive (the Cabinet), Dilution of
Gubernatorial Authority, and Fragmentation of
Executive Power.

This constant competition for power led to distrust among
temporary allies, who were always looking down the road to the next
election, the next political alignment, and their opportunity for a turn at
the top. To keep the victor from enjoying too much in the way of
spoils, the Reconstruction era constitution of 1885, which remained in
effect until 1968, limited the Governor to a single four year term.2
Power passed quickly. What is more, the Governor served only as a
"first among equals." Many executive departments were not under the
control of the Governor, but of the Governor and the Cabinet.
c.

Florida's Cabinet and its Authority.

The Cabinet is constitutionally established 3 , although its history
goes back to the 1885 constitution. Its members are the Secretary of
State, Attorney General, Comptroller, Commissioner of Insurance,
Commissioner of Agriculture, and Commissioner of Education. Each is
constitutionally the head of their own department. Like the Governor,
its members run statewide for election to four year terms and have
political bases independent from the Governor. They are not even of
Despised by most
the same political party as the Governor.
Governors, who resent its "intrusion" into what they view as their
mandate to govern, the Cabinet has been much criticized as inefficient
and fractious.4 Members have had exceptionally long terms of service,
but historically none have been able to use the positions as stepping
stones to Governorship, although many have tried.
In conjunction with the Governor, Cabinet officers exercise many
of the important executive powers of the state, such as granting
executive clemency.5 Rule promulgation and final order adoption often
requires action by a collegial agency head, the Governor and the
Cabinet, rather than by the Governor or by a departmental Secretary
alone. Of 25 executive departments authorized by the current state
Constitution, the Governor heads only 13 through appointment of a
Secretary who serves at the Governor's pleasure.6 The rest are
2 Florida

Constitution, Article IV, Section 2 (1885).

3 Florida Constitution, Article IV,Section 4 (1968)
4 See, e.g., J. Landers, "The Myth of the Florida Cabinet System: The Need to

Restructure Florida 's Executive Branch," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1089 (1992).
5 Florida Constitution, Article 4, Section 8 (1968).
6 Morris, A. The Flonda Handbook, 1991-92, 7-8.
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Executive Director agencies, headed instead by an executive
appointed by and answerable jointly to the Governor and the Cabinet.
These agencies perform some of the most important functions of
government, e.g., the Department of Revenue (tax assessment and
levy authority), and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles (includes state police force, the Highway Patrol). Other
entities similarly under joint control include the Administration
Commission (controls budget transfers among all agencies and the
courts); the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (holds
the title to all state land and grants leases of sovereignty lands); the
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (enters final orders in major
environmental permitting cases); the State Board of Administration
(issues full faith and credit bonds on behalf of the state and controls
In the case of the
investments of the state pension funds).
Department of Education, the department with the largest budget, the
Governor and Cabinet serve as the State Board of Education, with
substantial control over school boards, community colleges and state
universities, and licensing of private colleges, universities, and trade
schools, but the Commissioner of Education, who is a statewide
elected official and a member of the Cabinet, heads the department.
d.

Role and Structure of the Division of Administrative
Hearings.

The role legislatively assigned to the Division of Administrative
Hearings (Division) is consistent with Florida's history of fragmentation
of executive power. The Division was created in 1974 by Chapter 120,
Florida Statutes, and enjoys no constitutional status. There had been
no comparable agency under the 1961 state Administrative Procedure
Act. A new Administrative Procedure Act was carefully drafted in 1973
by a group known as the Florida Law Revision Council, a sort of thinktank for the Legislature, which drew upon the expertise of the newly
created Center for Administrative Justice of the American Bar
Association; a similar review was undertaken by the Florida House of
Representatives' Committee on Governmental Operations. A group of
draftsmen from both groups visited the State of California from Dec. 17
to 21, 1973, to study that state's central panel. The Division is
substantially patterned on California's system of Hearing Examiners, as
it existed in 1974.7,8
7 Calif. Gov. Code, Sec. 11370 et seq. (1966), as amended by Calif. Stat.
1971, ch. 1303, sections 1 through 5; Calif. Gov. Code Sec. 11512 (Supp. 1975).
8 See, H. Levinson, "The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision
and 1975 Amendments", 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 617, 660 & n. 255 (1975).

XV

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 77
1.

The Division Director.

The director is appointed by the Governor and Cabinet, sifting as
the Administration Commission (which requires the vote of the
Governor plus three other members of the Cabinet) and also requires
confirmation by the State Senate. 9 The Director essentially serves
during good behavior, as removal would also require an affirmative
vote of the-Governor plus three Cabinet members. Functionally the
Director is not subject to replacement just because administrations
change. The Director is responsible for the operation of the Division,
and may hear cases, but ordinarily does not. Annually the Director
must file a report with the Administration Commission summarizing the
extent agencies have used Hearing Officers, and making
recommendations for changes or improvements in the Administrative
Procedure Act. 10
2.

The Assistant Director.

An Assistant Director is appointed by the Director. The job is
classified as a Select Exempt position, so the incumbent serves at the
pleasure of the Director, enjoying no tenure rights as Assistant
Director. The Assistant Director is also a Hearing Officer, and does
Duties of the position include
hear a small docket of cases.
supervision of all personnel, i.e., the District Hearing Officers, Hearing
Officers, employees of the Office of the Clerk, and other administrative
personnel. The Assistant Director is also responsible for preparation of
the legislative budget request, for all expenditures, procurement, the
maintenance of appropriate audit procedures, and the security of the
Division's physical facilities and equipment.
3.

Appointment, Qualifications and Compensation
Hearing Officers.

of

Hearing officers are appointed by the Division Director. Statutorily,
they must be members of The Florida Bar in good standing for the
previous 5 years.11 This is the same requirement that is imposed on
candidates for positions as state trial judges of general jurisdiction
under the Florida Constitution, in Article V, Section 8 (1972). The
average legal experience of current Hearing Officers is actually about
15 years, substantially above the statutory minimum. Rules of the
division identify criteria for the Director to consider in appointments,
9 Florida Statutes, Section 120.65(1).
10 Florida Statutes, Section 120.70.

11Florida Statutes, Section 120.65(4).
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without imposing additional minimum qualifications for hiring. The rule
instructs the Director to evaluate the following in hiring decisions:
Academic12 achievement, past experience, writing ability, and personal
qualities.
The positions are much sought after, and competition for available
positions is intense. There are no salary steps for Hearing Officers, as
the federal government has for its Administrative Law Judges. Salaries
are identical for all line Hearing Officers, without regard to length of
service, though there is a small supplement for the managers. This is
not typical of other Career Service positions in Florida, and requires
adjustment of the salary "rate" in the appropriations process. [Rate is
an arcane budgetary concept mastered only by budget officers]. The
current annual salary is about $82,000, which is above that of most
agency general counsels, and certainly at the top of Career Service
positions.
Hearing Officers write their own interlocutory orders and decisions.
The Division employs no staff law clerks. Discovery procedures are
essentially the same as those available in the state trial courts, and in
major cases, discovery orders may become as complex as those in
federal courts. Questions of privilege can be similarly complex. Under
Florida's APA parties have the right to submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, but Hearing Officers don't adopt them
When they are filed, the Hearing Officer must rule
wholesale.
specifically on every proposed finding, for Section 120.59 (2), Florida
Statutes states: "[T]he order shall include a ruling upon each proposed
finding ..."
Administrative duties include tracking hearing hours scheduled and
canceled within 30 days of the hearing date, which are reported when
each case is closed, to provide the data base for budgetary
assessments against user agencies by the Legislature.
4.

District Hearing Officers.

District Hearing Officers maintain active case dockets of their own
and supervise the work of Hearing Officers. Line Hearing Officers are
assigned to one of three geographical districts in which they travel to
conduct hearings. There are no regional offices for the Division
throughout the state. These supervising Hearing Officers assign cases
to Hearing Officers in their districts, coordinate schedules for travel and
adjust uneven workloads, which can easily arise from filing of cases
which are entitled statutorily to expedited treatment, such as bid
12

Flonda Administrative Code, Rule 60Q-1.008.
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protests, road contractor disqualifications, health care certificate of
need cases, and emergency license suspension cases. They monitor
the timeliness of case dispositions, using management reports which
identify cases that have exceeded predetermined time criteria for major
steps in case processing. In the eyes of the Legislature, this function
is the most important difference between the Division and the courts,
which are viewed as black holes from which cases never emerge.
District Hearing Officers also perform pre-issuance review of final,
recommended, and non-routine interlocutory orders for such things as
logic, grammar, typos, unexplained departure from prior orders of other
Hearing Officers, or for failure to address controlling statutes, rules, or
judicial precedent. Non-routine interlocutory orders include those that:
1) involve novel questions of substantive law or procedure, or
issues of first impression,
2) would impact or depart from prior practices of the Division,
3) are at variance with previous administrative orders or judicial
precedent,
appellate courts,
4) involve remands from user agencies or from
13
5) recuse or disqualify the Hearing Officer.
Review is collegial; the District Hearing Officers have no authority to
require any changes by the Hearing Officer. Hearing Officers are not
judges under guardianship.
e.
The Division Enjoys Functional Independence.
The Division is not a separate department because the state
Florida
constitution limits state government to 25 departments.
Constitution, Article IV, Section 6 (1968). The Division has been.
placed in the Department of Management Services, which does not
even appear on the Division's letterhead. The Division hears cases
involving that Department's substantive role as the state purchasing,
personnel and general services agency. Statutorily, the Division "shall
not be subject to control, supervision, or direction by the Secretary of
the Department of Management Services in any manner, including, but
involving real or
not limited to, personnel, purchasing, transactions
14
personal property, and budgetary matters".
1.

Separate budget entity.

The Division does not submit its budget to the Department of
Management Services, or even to the Executive Office of the
Governor, but directly to the presiding officer of each house of the
13 DOAH
14 Flonda

Heating Officer Manual, p.34-35.
Statutes, Section 120.65 (1).
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Legislature, just as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida
does for the judicial branch.15 The Director of the Division of
Administrative Hearings may appeal to the Administration Commission
any adverse budgetary or personnel action which the Executive Office
of the Governor proposes to take. 16 The Governor cannot block a
matter from the Commission's agenda. And unlike most matters on
the Administration Commission agenda, it is not necessary for the
majority for the Division's appeal of an
Governor to vote with the
17
adverse action to succeed.
2.

Legislative Suspicion of Executive Power is
Inherent in Florida's APA and the Division's Role.

Under Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, persons whose
substantial interests are affected by proposed executive actions,
whether taken by rule or by order, may challenge them in trial type
proceedings conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings.
These proceedings create a record, amenable to judicial review,
resolving disputed issues of material fact, describing the formulation of
agency policy if it has not been adopted in rule-making, and testing
whether the rule or order is within the authority legislatively delegated
to the agency. This process also allows for more effective legislative
oversight of executive decisions implementing a program.
A.

Recommended Orders.

Cases generally are heard on referral from agencies, and closed
with a recommended order sent back to the agency. A very few
agencies are exempted and have their own fact-finders in house
(Workers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, and the
Formal evidentiary
Public Employees Relations Commission).
proceedings arise when a state agency proposes to adversely affect
the "substantial interests" of a person.18 Cases involve subject matters
as varied as the reach of substantive state authority. The agency may
decline to refer a case involving a disputed issue of material fact only if
the agency head personally conducts the proceeding, but professional
licensing boards must refer all disciplinary cases involving their
licensees. 9 In one unusual case an agency head (the Commissioner
of Insurance, a Cabinet member) tried to conduct a proceeding
15 Florida Statutes, Section 216.032 (2).
16 Floida

Statutes, Section 120.65 (2).

17 Id.
18 Florida
19 Florida

Statutes, Section 120.57.
Statutes, Section 120.57 (1) (a).
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personally, and the proceeding went badly procedurally because the
agency head had no experience conducting trial type proceedings.
The appellate court directly remanded the matter to the Division to
conduct the proceeding anew, American Insurance Association v.
Dep't. of Insurance, 518 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. App. 1987). Over time the
Division has earned the respect of the courts for the quality of its
hearings, and the courts expect administrative hearings from all
agencies to meet those standards.
B.

Declaratory Statements.

The Division may also conduct declaratory statement proceedings
under Section 120.54 (3) (a), Florida Statutes, when some other
statute requires the Division to conduct them. These are quite rare.
They are similar to declaratory judgment actions.
C.

Final Orders.

A few types of proceedings are directly filed with the Division, and
closed with a final order, directly appealable to Florida's intermediate
appellate courts. The agency involved can take no action itself to alter
the Hearing Officer's decision. This is a further example of the
fragmentation of executive power, for as an independent agency, the
Division has direct authority to modify or invalidate the actions of other
executive agencies. There are several varieties of these cases.
1). Petitions challenging the procedural validity of, substantive
authority for, or constitutionality of proposed agency rules published in
the Florida Administrative Weekly for public comment.
These
proceedings must be2 °filed within 21 days of the publication of the
notice of rule-making.
2). Petitions challenging the substantive validity of an adopted rule
as an invalid exercise of delegated legislatively authority, which may be
filed at any time.21
3). Petitions challenging a policy of an agency which has not been
adopted as rule, but should have been, under the Florida APA's
definition of a rule. 22 This is a legislative attempt to deal with the vexing
problem variously known as "non-rule policy" or "underground rules."
This same problem is dealt with in Section 2-104 (4) of the 1981 Model
State Administrative Procedure Act, which requires agencies to adopt
through rule-making, as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable,
principles of law or policy declared as the basis for decisions in
20 Florida
21 Florida

Statutes, Section 120.54 (4).
Statutes, Section 120.56.
22 Florida Statutes, Section 120.535.
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particular cases. This provision has not proven to be satisfactory, for it
provides agencies with no incentives to engage in what they regard as
a laborious rule making process, after they have settled on policies
through a course of adjudications, nor does the Model Act impose any
penalties on agencies which fail to engage in the rule making
contemplated by that section.23
4). Petitions seeking reimbursement from state agencies of costs
and attorneys fees incurred in successful defense against agency
that the agency position
actions by small business parties, on the basis
24
was not substantially justified in law and fact.
5). Petitions filed by parents challenging the appropriateness of
individual education plans for special education students under the
federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USC Section
1601, et seq., and the state counterpart, Section 230.23 (1) (m),
Florida Statutes.
6). Petitions seeking approval of the continued involuntary
placement of mentally ill patients in public or private hospitals or
institutions under section 394.467 (4), Florida Statutes.
II.

ECONOMICS.
a.

Original Funding of the Division.

The original funding mechanism for the Division in 1975 was
General Revenue (GR) appropriations, which are highly subject to
holdbacks (across the board budget cuts) if quarterly projections for
state tax collections do not meet assumptions used in legislative
budget. No deficit spending is permitted by the state constitution.
b.

Intermediate Funding Mechanism.

Two large user agencies (Transportation and Professional
Regulation), which are heavily funded with trust funds of their own,
were required to contribute directly to the Division's Administrative
Trust Fund, in return for the assignment of Hearing Officer full-time
equivalents to handle work for those agencies (this pre-dated the
district Hearing Officer system.) Contributions to this Trust Fund would
not be subject to holdbacks, and were more stable income sources for
the Division. By FY 87-88 the GRI Trust Fund split was 78%/22%.
See also, A. Bonfield, "State Administrative Rule Making, Section 4.4.1,"
(Little, Brown 1994 Supp.); P. Dore, "Florida Limits Policy Development Through
Administrative Adjudication," 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 437 (1991), and the general
discussion in W. McGrath, et al., "Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative
Action" 43 Admin. L. Rev. 571, 733 through 741 (1991).
24 Flonda Statutes, Section 57.111.
23

XV

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 77

These two agencies complained to the appropriations committees, and
questioned the equity of being singled out to contribute to the Division's
budget when other user agencies did not.
c.

Cost ApportionmentStudy.

Beginning in May 1987, the Division tracked, as cases were
closed, the hours Hearing Officers spent in pre-hearing conferences,
motion
hearings,
hours
scheduled
for
hearings
later
canceled/continued within 30 days of the assigned hearing date (which
could not be used for hearing other cases), and hours spent in final
hearings.
d.

Study Results and Recommendations.

Based on the data collected, the Division recommended to the
Legislature that studies should be done annually on use of hearing
officer time by user agencies, attributing hearing hours scheduled or
used in each case to the year the case closed, (even though the hours
actually may have been scheduled or used in an earlier year), and that
the Legislature should require agencies to contribute their pro rata
share of the Division's budget to the Administrative Trust Fund when
their utilization reached 2.9% or more of the total hearing hours
scheduled by the Division.
The ratio of canceled/continued hearing hours to actual final
hearing hours was 2.5:1. The Division wanted to reduce the number of
cancellations and continuances. Hearing hours are like airline seats when the hearing time comes, if a hearing slot goes unused due to
settlement or continuance, that hearing capacity is gone. It can't be
utilized by another litigant or user agency. Agencies should pay for
time scheduled for their hearings unless the hearing is canceled soon
enough for the Division to devote that time to hearing other cases. The
legislative staff understood that hearing hours were only a proxy for
total Hearing Officer time devoted to cases, and that the Division
depended on hearing cancellations to provide some of the time used
by Hearing Officers to write final and recommended orders. It was
never anticipated that continuances would be eliminated, and they
have not been.
e.

Current Funding Mechanism.

The appropriations committees of the Legislature adopted the
suggested funding mechanism. Over time the minimum utilization
percentage of scheduled hours used to identify agencies required to
contribute to the Division's Administrative Trust fund has declined to
much less than 2.9%. This brings more agencies into the process as
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contributors to the Division's Trust Fund. Transfers from agency
budgets to the Division's Administrative Trust Fund are made directly in
the General Appropriations Act itself, based on the latest available
utilization data. An important advantage of this system is that no bills
are sent to agencies by the Division, which would be risky. Without
timely payment, the Division would have budget shortfalls, and the
agencies would have passive-aggressive ways of tweaking (if not
punishing) the Division for any decisions the agencies didn't like. Even
without considering any element of retribution, agencies always have
internal incentives to "stretch their payables" in times of tight money
and delay payment, which would cause the very cash flow problems for
the Division which the trust fund system is designed to avoid. In FY
1987-88 the GR/Trust Fund ratio in the Division's budget was
16%/84%. By FY 92-93, the Division operating budget was fully trust
funded. Later some General Revenue was appropriated to the Division
for special projects, e. g., creation of an executive branch network for
computer access to agency orders and other archival materials. See
the following comparison of General Revenue to trust funding for each
FY from FY 87-89 through 93-94.
Florida Division of Administrative Hearings
Comparison of General Revenue to Trust Funding
for Fiscal Years 1987-88 through 1993-94
and Average Cost per Case Closed
87-88

FY 88-89

FY 89-90

FY 90-91

FY 91-92

FY 92.93

FY 93-94

$2,842,448

$2,274,228

$1,175,985

$585,014

$574,656

$0

$344,058

$803,457

$1,520,599

$3,108,015

$3,699,969

$3,952,596

$4,578,161

$4,660,885

:.$3,645,905

. $3,794,827

$4,284,000

$4,284,983:: ..:$4,527,252

$4,578,161

$5,004,943

6,012

6,911

7,135

7,675

8,312

7,076

6,720

$606

$549

$600

$558

$545

$647

$745

_-_....__.FY

Actual
Expenditures:
General
Revenue
Trust
Fund
TOTAL ..
Number
of Cases
Closed
Average
Cost per
Case
Closed

Source: Budget Officer, Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, 10/20/94
f.
Current Breakdown of Appropriated Funds.
Salaries and Benefits are about 80% of the Division's current
budget. This is the main reason budget shortfalls are such serious
problems. The Expense category (including travel costs of about
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$150,000, as all Hearing Officers live in Tallahassee and travel around
the state to conduct hearings) makes up another 13% of the budget.
The remainder is made up of Other Capital Outlay and Other
Personnel Services, which combined equal 7%. Historical percentages
are similar.
g.
Current Case Processing.
The Division is able to keep up with the case filings by closing
about as many cases as are filed annually. The statistics on case
closures in recent years is set out in the following table.
FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FY 1986-87 through 1993-94
Cases opened, Closed, Standing Caseload per Hearing Officer,
and Percentage Change by Category
68-87
5,407

Cases
Opened
Percent
Increase/
(Decrease)
Cases
Closed
Percent
Increase/(D
ecrease)
Adjusted
Hearing
Officer
Strength
Percent
Increase/
(Decrease)
Standing
Caseload
Per Heanng
Officer
Percent
Increase/
(Decrease)

87-88
6,271

as8-69
6,847

89-90
7,708

90-91
8,468

15.98%

9.19%

12.57%

9.86%

.91-92:

8,651
2.16%

92-93
7,418
(14.25%

-93-94
7.190
(3.07%)

)
5,528

24.54

97.31

6,012

6,911

7,135

7,675

8,312

8.76%

14.95%

3.24%

7.57%

8.30%

(14.87%

(5.03%)

26.65

29.11

31.00

30.00

30.00

30.00

28.66

8.60%

9.23%

6.49%

(3.23%)

0.00%

0.00%

(4.47%)

93.02

92.61

107.55

99.47

92.90

107.83

121.74

(4.41%)

(0.44%)

16.13%

(7.51%)

(6.61%)

16.07%

12.89%

7,076

6,720

Source: Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, 7/27/1994
III.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FLORIDA'S STRUCTURE.
a.

Statutory ProhibitionAgainst Ex parte Contacts.

Politics is largely removed from the administrative hearing process
by the state's statutory prohibition on ex parte contact. Under Section
120.66, Florida Statutes an agency head, public employee, party, or
official involved in advocacy in a matter under consideration by a
Hearing Officer, or factually related to it, may not:
1). communicate about the merits of the case;
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2). make any threat to a Hearing Officer;
3). offer any reward to a Hearing Officer;
Legislators and program administrators
under penalty of fine.
generally (though erroneously) believe it is a crime to do these things.
Administrators contact the Division Director, not the Hearing Officer
assigned to a case, if they feel a Hearing Officer has been guilty of
inappropriate conduct in one of their cases. Most of these complaints
are only sour grapes, and are not the basis for any adverse personnel
action involving Hearing Officers. After all, the likelihood of agency
managers interpreting rejection of their positions during the course of
litigation as Hearing Officer misconduct is one of the major reasons the
Division of Administrative Hearings became a separate entity.
b.

Remedies for Ex parte Contacts.

If any of the persons named above attempt to engage in an ex
parte contact, the Hearing Officer must make any such written
communication, or a summary of any oral communication, part of the
record in the proceeding, and offer adversaries the opportunity to rebut
the communication. Essentially all case files are public documents,
and the aggressive Florida press would likely treat such a disclosure as
evidence of an agency attempt to "fix" a case. Because the Division's
proceedings look like non-jury trials, almost always involve lawyers,
and in many cases involve final orders directly appealable to the
intermediate appellate courts, non-lawyers regard the Division's cases
as if they were judicial proceedings. Most politicians live and die by
their press coverage. The real potential for bad press and for needless
public embarrassment by other members of the collegial body who will
participate in the final action in the matter, should ex parte contacts
occur and be discovered, plus the likelihood of disqualification from
participating in any final action in the case, all lead agency heads and
their support personnel to keep out of adjudicatory proceedings.
C.

Implications.

The Governor and Cabinet members are the agency head in many
cases pending at the Division. They (and their staff) fall under, and do
respect the ex parte restrictions. Lesser agency heads do as well. All
have discovered:
1. The joy of buck passing. Ex parte communications statutes,
and restrictions against agency modification or alteration of fact
findings which are based on record evidence (if carefully enforced by
reviewing courts), permit political officers to commiserate with
supporters/constituents, but to avoid becoming involved in their cases.
They can truthfully tell supporters, "I'd love to help you, but after what
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the Hearing Officer did, there is just nothing the law lets me do for
you."
2. The perils of involvement. Politicians often have their own
friends/contributors on both sides of important or cutting edge
controversies, and are glad for a reason to stay out of such
troublesome situations.
3. The benefits of a neutral forum. When an agency takes an
action which is challenged as politically motivated, if that action is
upheld by a neutral Hearing Officer after a trial-type proceeding, as a
practical matter, the agency is absolved of charges of improper
motivation. This can be a substantial benefit in situations, for example,
where an agency head's political supporters are legitimate low bidders,
and the bid award is challenged by a disgruntled unsuccessful bidder.
4. Functional Insulation of the Division Director. Although no
statute forbids contact with the Director about a pending case, because
politicians and agency personnel perceive the proceeding as a judicial
one, they limit their inquiries of the Director to "When will the decision
be out?", not unlike the actions Members of Congress may undertake
for constituents involved in federal administrative cases, which is not
pressure to decide a case any particular way. Occasionally an agency
head may call the Division Director to complain about an unfavorable
decision, but by that point, the case is over and there is nothing for the
Division Director to do about it anyway. The Director has no appellate
authority over the decision of a hearing officer.
d.

Legislative Insulation from Agency Overreaching in
Cases Referred for Adjudication.

In addition to the risk of improper pressure being directed to a
that the
neutral factfinder, there is another risk of unfairness order
adverse
to
a
recommended
merely
re-write
agency
will
referring
Section
The substantial competent evidence rule,
its position.
120.57(1) (b) (10), Florida Statutes, prohibits agency modification of
findings of fact, unless there is no evidence in the record to support a
finding. This had been carefully enforced by reviewing appellate
courts, and most agencies have grudgingly come to accept it. Another
provision of the Florida APA provides that the referring agency shall
take no further action with respect to a formal proceeding, except as a
25
party litigant, as long as the Division has jurisdiction of a case.

25

Floida Statutes, Section 120.57(1) (b) (3).
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IV.

EVALUATION OF HEARING OFFICERS.
a.

Performance Standards.

Annual performance appraisals are required for all Career Service
Employees, Rule 60K-8, Fla. Admin. Code, and they are done for
Hearing Officers. Rating categories for each of the performance
standards for the position are Exceeds Standards, Achieves
Standards, and Below Standards. The rating is done by the District
Hearing Officer, and must be countersigned by the Assistant Director.
For an employee with permanent status in Career Service, a Below
Standards appraisal must be accompanied by a plan for improvement
to bring the employee up to standards.
The Division's Performance Standards for Hearing Officers are
given to new Hearing Officers when they are hired, and a receipt for
them is kept in the personnel file. The Performance Standards include:
i) Pre-hearing Management of Cases:
a) Promptly schedules cases for hearing.
b) Takes timely and correct action on motions and
discovery matters.
ii) Conducting Administrative Hearings:
a) Arrives at hearings and returns from recesses on
time.
b) Well prepared.
of trial
knowledge
adequate
c) Demonstrates
and
principles,
legal
applicable
procedure,
evidentiary standards.
d) Maintains firm control over proceedings.
iii) Issuance of Recommended and Final Orders:
a) Renders orders in a timely manner.
b) Good organization.
c) Well researched.
d) Shows logic and common sense.
e) Conclusions are legally correct.
iv) Overall Management of Caseload:
a) Schedules hearings and travel in a cost-effective
manner.
b) Processes cases to conclusion in an expeditious
manner.
c) Sets and enforces suspense dates on cases in
d)

abeyance.
Processes average number of (non-Baker act) cases
annually. (Calendar year statistical information for
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hearings held, hearing hours, recommended and final
orders issued, and cases closed will be used to
determine average.)
v) Manner of Performance:
a) Complies with Division administrative and policy
directives, both written and oral.
b) Exhibits tact, diplomacy, and courtesy in dealing with
others in official matters within and outside the
Division.
c) Exhibits a positive attitude and is supportive of
Division policies and stated goals.
b.
Use of Evaluations.

Evaluations are used for improvement, and not for pay purposes.
As Career Service employees, Hearing Offices are eligible for merit
pay when the Legislature makes such appropriations, but historically,
management allocates that money to support staff, to whom it is a
more meaningful "bonus." This also maintains salary parity among
Hearing Officers, which has been a long term goal of management.
Only those rated as Exceeds Standards would be eligible for merit pay,
which would skew salaries. The major tool used to ensure productivity
is peer pressure. Management publishes average case processing
statistics and gives every Hearing Officer their monthly statistics. No
one wants to look like an unproductive judge. This process treats
Hearing Officers more like general jurisdiction trial judges, who have no
variation in salaries among themselves.
V.

TERMS AND RETENTION.
a.

No Term of Years, Removal for Cause.

After a six month probationary period a Hearing Officer becomes a
Career Service employee. Employees in the Career Service have a
statutorily protected property interest in their positions, and are
essentially employed during good behavior. The initial period of
probation can be extended once for another six months for poor
performance, and if the new Hearing Officer is not suited to the job, the
appointment can be terminated before the person obtains any
protected property interest in employment. No hearing rights attach to
such a termination under state law. Terminations of this kind have
rarely been necessary. This level of job protection is unusual for
professionals in state employment. Medical doctors, engineers, and
attorneys are in positions classified in the Select Exempt category of
state employment. They accrue leave at a higher rate, and generally
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have higher pay ranges than Career Service employees, but may be
terminated at any time without any need to show good cause for
separation from employment.
b.

Permanent Hearing Officers Removable Only for "Just
Cause."

A Hearing Officer who has obtained permanent status in the
position has the same protections in employment that other Career
Service employees enjoy. Separation requires a proceeding before the
Public Employees Relations Commission to establish just cause for
separation. 2 6 The Commission has its own Hearing Officers. "Just
cause" includes, but is not limited to: negligence, insubordination, willful
violation of the provisions of law or agency rules, conduct unbecoming
an employee, misconduct, habitual drug use, conviction of any crime
involving moral turpitude.27 .
No such proceeding has been filed against a Hearing Officer since
the Division was created.
VI.

FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING
INDEPENDENCE.
a.

TO

DECISIONAL

Organizational Structure of the Division.

The state APA and budgeting process deprives agency litigants of
control or influence over the Hearing Officers and over the Division in
personnel or financial matters. The Division is not dependent on any
user agency to fund it its program, but functions as an autonomous
entity.
b.
Prohibition Against Ex parte Communications.
The statutory prohibition against ex parte communications causes
agencies to treat the Division as they treat courts. They may not like
the results in individual cases, but they accept them as binding, until
they can change the result by amending their rules or by obtaining an
amendment to controlling statutes.
c.
The Legislatively Delegated Policy Role of the
Division.
Florida's APA is designed to require rule-making, it is not a matter
of agency discretion. 28 Agencies that ignore this requirement are
punished by losing control of their regulatory program. The Legislature
has determined that in cases where an agency attempts to rely on a
Florida Statutes, Section 110.227 (5)(a).
27
(1).
28 Flofida
Florida Statutes,Section
Statutes, Section110.227
120.535(1).
26
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policy that has not been formally promulgated as a rule, unless the
agency proves that a specific statutory exception to required rulemaking applies, the Hearing Officer, not the agency, develops the
policy to be applied in the adjudication. The policy the Hearing Officer
applies is based on the evidence adduced in that case, for in the
course of the hearing, each non-agency party may propose an
alternative policy, and Hearing Officer's choice of which policy is most
consistent with legislative intent becomes a protected finding of fact
29
retain complete
which controls the outcome in that case. Agencies
30
rule-making.
in
engaging
by
however,
control,
policy
This aspect of Florida's APA makes very clear to agencies the
legitimacy of outside review of their actions. This has a significant
carryover effect. Even in cases involving traditional fact-finding rather
than policy development, agencies expect to be called upon to
demonstrate that their actions are rational and consistent with the
authority delegated to them in the text of applicable statutes.
Internal Collegial Pre-publicationReview of Orders.
d.
A general attitude of respect for the decisions rendered by the
corps of central panel judges in the appellate courts and legislative
committees (both substantive committees and appropriations
committees) is invaluable. A high quality work product enhances the
deference accorded to orders on judicial review. Internal collegial
review within the central panel catches potential errors that agencies
would seize on as arguments for exemptions from the requirement to
use the central panel, and return to a system of controlling their own
Remember, Florida's Division of
internal hearing officers.
Administrative Hearings has no constitutional authority, and poor work
product can fuel agency moves for changes to the state APA.
VIEW
USERS
HOW AGENCY
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.

VII.

a.

THE

DIVISION

OF

Primary Agency Concern is Ability to Meet Hearing
Demand.

The Division has generally been able to provide timely hearings to
agencies. The number of hours of hearing scheduled and hours
actually heard is shown in the following chart for fiscal years 1987
through 1993-93.
Flonda Statutes, Sections 120.535; 120.57 (1) (b) (10),(15).
See generally, S. Maher, "Florida Administrative Procedure Act
Amendments," 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 367, 390 ff. (1992).
29
30
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FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Summary of Hearing Hours Scheduled and Held
1987-88 through 1993-94

Hearing Hours Scheduled by

25,069

23,883

28,022

29,419

31,056

26,006

25,445

(4.73%)

17.33%

4.99%

5.56%

(16.26%)

(2.16%)

5,777

5,818

6,506

6,292

6,504

4,951

5,106

341

369

478

567

571

523

439

6,118

6,187

6,984

5,859

7,075

5,474

5,545

1.13%

12.88%

(1.79%)

3.15%

(22.63%)

(1.30%)

Agencies
Percent Increase/ (Decrease)
Actual Hearing Hours Held:
Regular
Baker Act**
TO0TA
L
Percent Increase/ (Decrease)
Number Actual Hearings Held:
Regular

1,293

1,316

1,448

1,326

1,291

1,104

1,061

Baker Act**

2,165

2,619

3,737

3,781

4,109

3,537

3,313

TOTAL

3458

3,935

5 185

5,107

5,400

4,641

4,374

13.79%

31.77%

(1.50%)

5.74%

(14.06%)

(5.75%)

Percent Increase/ (Decrease)

1

*NOTE: In FY 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90, hours scheduled were reported as
follows-

1987-88:

12/1/87 - 11/30/88

1988-89

12/1/88 - 11/30/89

1989-90

12/1/89 - 11/30/90

**Baker Act cases are brief hearings conducted to determine whether persons
involuntarily committed to state or private mental health facilities shall be retained
for another six month period. Statistics on these high volume cases are kept
separately for some management purposes.
Source: Florida Division of
Administrative Hearing, Revised 8/02/1994
b.

Tendency to See Decisions as Work of the Division, as
an Institution, Rather than as Products of Individual
Hearing Officers.

Agency managers tend to view the decisions of the Division's
Hearing Officers as work of the Division as an institution, and not as
the work of individuals. They fail often to realize the individual choices
made by one Hearing Officer may not be the same that another would
make on similar evidence in another case, because different credibility
choices could be made. This can lead to requests to do such things as
'sensitivity training" for Hearing Officers. This is really only an attempt
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to lobby the fact-finders, outside the context of a specific adjudication,
to support or accept the agency point of view. Sometimes the agency
managers must be told bluntly that every Hearing Officer gets all the
training required to decide every case - its called the trial.
Initial Agency Resentment of "Usurpation" of or
c.
Intrusion into its Policy Role, Followed by Later
Understanding of How the Work of the Division Can be
Useful.
No administrative agency welcomes the independent review, and
rejection, of any of its work. Agencies learn that the review provided
by an independent central panel is not an unalloyed evil. Through the
cases heard and orders entered by the central panel, the Legislature
gets a neutral analysis of agency action, both in individual instances
and in the full range of litigated cases. Agency decisions entered after
litigation before a fact finder perceived as neutral helps well managed
agencies dealing with controversial programs. It also hurts poorly
managed agencies prone to arbitrary or ill-considered action by
exposing their folly in detail. These case records can be effectively
used by agencies to disprove complaints from regulated groups about
arbitrary or high-handed agency action. For example, if a legislative
committee receives a coordinated series of complaints that the
environmental protection agency is acting irrationally in its wetland
permitting program, but the record of enforcement proceedings heard
by independent adjudicators from the state central panel shows only
that the agency took action to stop midnight dredging of wetlands by
an owner or group of owners who were trying to evade the permitting
process, the agency has a convincing defense before its oversight
committee.
Agencies also find they get better analysis of facts and policy
involved in their cases than they get in the state's constitutional courts,
which have no requirement to enter detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as Hearing Officers must under Florida's APA.
Recommended and final orders must include particularized rulings on
31
proposed findings of fact. This has been rather strictly enforced by
the appellate courts. Kinast v. Dep't. of Professional Regulation, 458
So. 2d 1342 (Fla App. 1984), and agencies and private parties like it
more than a brief order from a court merely "finding in favor of
petitioner and against respondent," bereft of any careful analysis of
their positions.
31 Florida

Statutes, Section 120.59 (2).
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Eventually agencies develop confidence in the integrity of the
hearing process, and learn that it is not just a forum to embarrass
them, but to let them explain to a neutral why they have done what
they have done. Agency heads also don't bother trying to conduct
their own hearings anymore, and willingly send them to the central
panel. Some Florida agencies offer regulated parties the option to
send a case to the Division for adjudication even when it involves no
disputed fact issues, only a point of law, as a means of showing
confidence in the soundness of its interpretation of a statute, rule, or
judicial decision. This is especially true in tax cases, where the
controlling facts are rarely in dispute. The Division usually declines
these cases as beyond its jurisdiction.
Decisions of central panels, if they are well indexed for use by
practitioners before an agency, also provides a data base for members
of the press, the "fourth branch" of government, who may be assigned
to research how various state programs are being administered. This
is especially true for programs which generate a large volume of
litigation. For example, after a decision in a notorious malpractice
case, a newspaper may want to research whether the state Board of
Medical Quality Assurance brings any/many discipline cases against
licensees for incompetence, after they have had "x" number of
successful malpractice actions brought against them, and if so how
many such licensees have been disciplined in the past two years?
Reading the decisions of the central panel provides a kind of program
audit done by independent fact-finders that can be useful to those in
and outside of government. Well managed agencies learn to maximize
the public relations advantage this kind of information provides to them.

VIII.

LESSONS
MANAGEMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY.
a.

FROM

THE

STATE

Excessive Delay: Any Central Panel's Achilles' Heel.

Any central panel system can be undone by an inefficient
management information system which doesn't closely track cases,
and allows cases to age excessively. The main advantage of a
specialized administrative hearing system to the legislature is the ability
to get cases decided promptly and with a level of detail in the decision
appropriate to what is at risk in the controversy. This can't be done if
management doesn't know where the old cases are, why they are
aging, and how to re-allocate resources to get old cases out.
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b.

Once the Corps is Independent, New Judges Should
Obtain Permanent Status Only After Some On-The-Job
Trial Period of Brief Duration.

In the current federal system, the process to choose ALJs is
cumbersome. At its end, new ALJs get immediate tenure. This
appropriately insulates judges from improper pressure from the
employing agency to decide cases in a way that pleases the current
agency administration. Once an ALJ corps is independent, that reason
loses force. The type of person who is an appropriate candidate for
judicial office values decisional independence, and will not be attracted
to a position with a high degree of intrusive management control. The
type of lawyers who have the level of litigation experience to qualify for
ALJ positions need rather limited supervision in order to get their work
out. On the other hand, there is no right to be a judge. If the hiring
authority comes to understand that it has made a serious error in hiring
within a brief period, such as six months, because the new judge just
can't write intelligibly, control a hearing, or efficiently administer a
docket and get cases out in a timely manner, it is in the interest of the
entire corps of judges to take early action and find a new candidate for
the position. The probationary period should be brief, for the kind of
defects warranting replacement should be obvious quickly. This has
rarely been necessary in Florida's central panel. If the chief judge or a
council is to be responsible for the functioning of the independent corps
of federal administrative law judges, there should be a way to handle
the problem before the new judge obtains a property right in the
position. It should remain very difficult to take action against a judge
who has obtained permanent status.
C.

Maintenance of Decisional Quality.

Many state central panels have a type of collegial review of
decisions before they are released for publication. The intensity of
review may vary according to the high volume or routine nature of
certain types of cases. This tradition of internal review is common at
the appellate level, where the courts often sit in panels. Judges of the
court have the opportunity to review decisions, whether or not they are
on a panel, before they are published. The federal system should
consider what types of collegial internal pre-publication review is
appropriate for different types of cases, in order to maintain high
decisional quality in its corps of ALJs when it establishes an
independent central panel of ALJs for the federal government.

